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ANTITRUST SUITS BY TARGETS 
OF TENDER OFFERS 
Frank H. Easterbrook* 
.Daniel R Fischel** 
Managers of firms subject to unwanted tender offers have devised 
many strategies for defeating or delaying the bids. Some of these 
devices may violate state rules because they use the target's resources 
to preserve the managers' jobs. Others do not work against deter-
mined bidders. 
One of the most effective defensive strategies is to invoke the aid 
of courts. The target argues that the acquisition proposed by the bid-
der would violate the antitrust laws.~ If the court enjoins the acquisi-
tion, even the most determined bidder must surrender. The 
managers of Grumman and Marathon defeated strong bids by LTV 
and Mobil in just this way.1 And the strategy appears immune from 
complaints by shareholders. What could be objectionable about ac-
tion by a target's management that protects shareholders from the 
consequences of an antitrust violation while simultaneously vindi-
cating the public's interest in vigorous antitrust enforcement? 
We explore in this Article the basis and consequences of the tar-
get's suit under the antitrust laws.2 We approach the question from 
the perspective of federal antitrust law and state corporation law. 
We argue in Part I that the target is a singularly poor "private 
attorney general" because it is a beneficiary, not a victim, of any 
violation. An antitrust suit thus must be understood as an attempt 
by managers to defend their own positions, not as an attempt to vin-
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I. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
:tdobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982). 
2. We extend the brief discussions that appear elsewhere in the literature. 2 P. AREEDA & 
D. 'fuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 346b (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1192-94 (1981); 
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation 
of Cash Tender Offers, 51 TExAs L. REv. 1, 36-39 (1978). See also Sidak,Antitrust Preliminary 
Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 KAN. L. REv. _ (1982) (emphasizing relative error 
costs). 
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dicate the public interest. In the jargon of antitrust, the target is not 
a victim of "antitrust injury" and therefore is not entitled to sue for 
damages or an injunction. We proceed in Part II ~o study the conse-
quences of defense for shareholders. We show there that sharehold-
ers are entitled, under state law, to any benefits that flow from tender 
offers; managers are not free to pursue their own conceptions of the 
public interest to the detriment of investors. 
J. ANTITRUST INJURY 
A. The Role of Antitrust Sanctions 
We start from the proposition that antitrust sanctions, whether 
damages or injunctions, are designed to deter offenses and to com-
pensate those who suffer injury. They are not, however, designed to 
deter all offenses or compensate all injuries, else there would be no 
limit to the severity of fines and no limit to the category of parties 
entitled to bring suit. Violators are not hanged or stoned; well-
meaning people cannot sue unless they suffer injury; and even those 
who suffer injury in fact must show that the injury flows from that 
which makes the acts in question unlawful. This is the "antitrust 
injury" requirement of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 3 
The developing economic treatment of optimal penalties explains 
these and related rules concerning sanctions. The principal task in 
designing remedies is to establish the optimal level of violations. 
Thus, in the law of contracts, damages remedies depend on the loss 
to the party suffering by the breach. If the cost of performance has 
risen so that the promisor would lose more than the promisee gains, 
the promisor may elect to pay damages rather than perform the con-
tract. 4 Nonperformance is desirable in such circumstances, and the 
contracting parties would provide for nonperformance if they could 
negotiate contracts that covered all contingencies. In the law of nui-
sance, damages measures allow some level of noise or soot without 
remedy, and damages for higher levels are calibrated to permit a 
desirable amount of the otherwise obnoxious conduct to continue.5 
3. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
4. See Shavell, .Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J, EcoN, 466 (1980), 
5. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1105-10 (1972); Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance .Dis-
putes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and .Damage Remedies, 32 STAN, L. REV. 1075 
(1980). See also Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J, 
LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). There is a delicate interplay between damages and injunctions in the 
law of nuisance, see Ellickson,Altematives lo Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as 
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 738-48 (1973), but we postpone discussion of this 
problem to Part I-C. 
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Things are much the same in the antitrust law if one assumes, as 
we do, that the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition and 
maximize the allocative efficiency of the economy.6 Antitrust viola-
tions then are forbidden in the same sense that breaches of contract 
are forbidden: The law establishes a price for the violation, and peo-
ple then must decide how to respond to the schedule of penalties. 
Some antitrust violations are efficient, just as some breaches of con-
tract are efficient. One has only to think of an action (say, a merger 
or the building of a new plant by a monopolist) that, although creat-
ing or augmenting the firms' market power, also enables the firms to 
reduce substantially the costs of production.7 An optimal schedule 
of penalties allows "efficient violations" to take place, while it deters 
other violations. 
A court could, in principle, determine whether the benefits of a 
merger or other conduct exceed the losses and draw the line of prohi-
bition accordingly. Two scholars have argued that courts should do 
just this for mergers.8 But a complete cost-benefit calculus, like the 
design of industry structure, is beyond the ability of courts. The 
amount of savings to be had from a merger is uncertain; resolution 
of the uncertainties is too much to expect, even if courts could obtain 
6. There has been substantial dispute over the years about the purposes of the antitrust 
laws, but recent cases, including Brunswick and, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
343 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1~ 9-10, 19-
20 (1979); National Socy. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.21 (1977), have con-
cluded that efficiency is the appropriate goal of antitrust. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 
Stlpra note 2, at~~ 103-113, and R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-89 (1978), for com-
pelling arguments that efficiency is the only appropriate goal. 
7. Brunswick may have been such a case, as a large manufacturer of pinsetting equipment 
acquired some bowling establishments, and a rival establishment complained that the acquisi-
tion would cause it to lose money. The court of appeals' finding of liability was based in part 
on its conclusion that Brunswick !night obtain some cost savings. NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. 
v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262,268 (3d Cir. 1975). This supports our reading of the case. It 
is possible, however, to interpret Brunswick as a case in which the complaining establishment 
lost the market power it would have obtained had the other establishments gone out of busi-
ness; parts of the Court's opinion say that a firm cannot recover under the antitrust laws for 
loss of the profits available from a reduction in competition. 429 U.S. at 488. But this cannot 
be the best interpretation. If the other establishments would have gone out of business but for 
the acquisition, then under the failing company doctrine there would have been no violation of 
the anti~t laws. The Supreme Court decided the case on the assumption that the acquisi-
tions were unlawful, which means that it must have assumed that the other establishments 
would have stayed in business no matter what. (Neither the Supreme Court nor the court of 
appeals remarked on the inconsistency between plaintiffs' damages theory and the theory of 
liability. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without .Damage Recoveries, 89 HAR.v. L. REv. 1127, 
1132 & n.34 (1976).) 
8. Muris, The Efficiency .Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv. 381 (1979); Williamson,EconomiesasanAntitrust .Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
699 (1977) (discussing earlier writings). Williamson calls for qualitative rather than quantita-
tive consideration of econoinies. 
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the data at reasonable cost (and they cannot do even this).9 Courts 
decline to attempt such an expensive and speculative task, just as 
courts refuse to allow a promisor to defend a breach-of-contract suit 
by saying that the cost of performance has increased. 
The difficulties with an efficiencies defense in antitrust do not 
mean, however, that cost reductions are irrelevant. They operate in 
antitrust, as in contract and tort law, by putting the defendants to a 
choice: defendants may continue their conduct and face the risk of 
paying damages, or they may avoid liability by desisting (or never 
setting out on a questionable course). If damages are calibrated by 
the harm done to consumers, divided by the probability of detec-
tion, 10 firms can decide for themselves whether the savings justify the 
conduct. If they do, the firms will carry on, and if not, not. A system 
of damages based on harm done enables the firms, which have the 
,, best access to information, to decide whether a course of conduct 
yields savings that exceed any harms. 11 The court needs to ascertain 
only the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus. 
Even if a court could determine the total costs and benefits of 
particular courses of conduct, identifying those that produce net 
gains in efficiency, it still would want to label some efficiency-creat-
ing acts as violations. This is not paradoxical. A given practice with 
allocative losses but offsetting gains produces prices higher than 
those prevailing under competition. Jf courts label these practices as 
violations, customers obtain damages in the amount of the over-
charge, and such overcharge-based recoveries reduce the substitution 
9. Robert Bork relies on this point in opposing an efficiencies defense in antitrust. R. 
BoRK, supra note 6, at 124-29. 
10. The trebling of damages in antitrust takes account of the fact that many violations, 
especially concealable ones such as price fixing, escape detection. 
11. This is an application of Gary Becker's seminal work on crime. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968). The approach has been 
applied to antitrust cases explicitly in, e.g.' R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW! AN ECONOMIC PER-
SPECTIVE 221-27 (1976); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC 
NoTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS S42-72 (2d ed. 1981); Easterbrook, PredalOIJ' Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 318-33 (1981); Landes & Posner, Should Indirect 
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue llnder the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule 
of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 602 (1979). 
Sanctions that do not eliminate all violations have some benefits in addition to those men-
tioned in the text. They reduce the total costs of enforcement; the cost of stamping out the last 
violation may far exceed the losses imposed by that violation. They also reduce the risk that 
antitrust law imposes on firms, risk that may be a dead-weight loss. See Block & Sidak, The 
Cost of Antitrust Delellence: Wlzy Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131 
(1980); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeo.ff Between the Probability and Magnitude of 
Fines, 69 AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1979). We do not develop these points further, however, be-
cause they do not advance or undermine any of the arguments concerning suits by targets. We 
also do not consider the possibility of criminal sanctions, which are imposed almost exclusively 
in price-fixing cases, where typically there are no efficiency gains. 
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that is the source of the welfare loss from monopolies. The alloca-
tive (deadweight) loss of monopoly occurs when purchasers, con-
fronted with a price for a product that exceeds its marginal cost, buy 
less of it and substitute something else - a something else that either 
costs more to produce or gives less satisfaction per dollar spent. The 
ability of purchasers to recover damages measured by the amount of 
the overcharge ( divided by the probability of detection) acts as a 
price reduction. If the damages are properly computed, they offset 
the monopoly price increase and its allocative distortions. Purchas-
ers treat the monopolized product as if it came with a cents-off cou-
pon equal to the expected damages recovery. If the process works 
flawlessly- a big if, to be sure - there will be no cutback to output, 
no allocative efficiency loss.12 Society will realize all of the produc-
tive efficiency gains attributable to the merger or other business 
practice. 
B. Antitrust Injury and Optimal Sanctions 
The Supreme Court's cases on antitrust remedies generally con-
form to the approach we have described.13 Consider Brunswick, the 
Court's best-known antitrust damages case. In Brunswick, a seller in 
a market affected by a merger sought treble damages, arguing that 
the firms participating in the merger attracted busip.ess that the 
plaintiff otherwise would have enjoyed. The Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiff could not collect damages, despite the existence of 
12. See Landes & Posner, supra note 11, for a demonstration that this process works even 
if only the direct purchaser can recover damages. The direct purchaser would treat its ex-
pected recoveries as a cost reduction and price its output accordingly. See also Landes & 
Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, I INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 127, 131-32 (1981) 
(showing that the award of damages in tort cases prevents the taldng of inefficient precautions 
by potential victims). 
The utility of damages in preventing substitution diminishes, of course, as it becomes more 
difficult for buyers to estimate the likelihood of antitrust recovery. Thus commercial buyers of 
large quantities may be in a position to make the appropriate estimates and adjustments, while 
consumers of small quantities would not. 
13. For example, purchasers may recover from sellers for the full overcharge, whether or 
not they passed on that overcharge, but they may not recover for noneconomic losses. Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (consumers may recover the full overcharge); Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (no recovery for nonspecific injury to "the economy" or 
"the quality of life"); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-94 
(1968) (recovery not defeated or diminished by proof that the purchaser ''passed on" some of 
the overcharge to its customers). See also J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 
U.S. 551 (1981) (only actual, antitrust injury is compensable); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720 (1977) (only direct purchasers may recover); Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 
661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1634 (1982) (buyers discouraged by 
higher prices may not recover for the lost purchases). But see Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing an employee of a purported violator to collect damages for 
his discharge even though he suffers none of the anticompetitive effects of the violation; the 
dissenting judge relies on Brunswick and earlier cases rejecting claims by employees). 
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injury inflicted on it by the merger, because the kind of injury in-
volved was not related to the reasons why the merger might be held 
unlawful. Mergers are unlawful, the Court pointed out, when they 
tend to reduce competition and create higher prices and lower out-
put. The plaintiff in .Brunswick was not the victim of higher prices; 
as a rival in the market, it would have gained by higher prices. It 
suffered from an excess of competition, as it saw things, and al-
though it was surely injured, it could not trace the injury to "that 
which made the acquisitions unlawful."14 
In other words, .Brunswick establishes that the antitrust laws do 
not provide a remedy for all dislocations caused by unlawful con-
duct.15 A firm cannot recover, say, for losses caused by an increase 
in productive efficiency attributable to a merger or for other conse-
quences that are beneficial to competition but nonetheless tied to an 
otherwise unlawful bundle of acts. 16 The plaintiff must establish 
that it suffers injury and that the injury flows from that which makes 
the acts unlawful - in economic terms, that the plaintiffs injury is 
part of or flows directly from the allocative efficiency loss of 
monopoly. 
The antitrust injury rule of .Brunswick implements the optimal 
damages approach we described above. By confining recoveries to 
the losses caused by the inefficient aspects of the defendant's con-
duct, the .Brunswick approach induces firms to compare productive 
efficiency gains against the welfare losses. The prospective defend-
ant will disregard, as it should, any private losses that may be associ-
ated with social gains. It will proceed on the questionable course of 
conduct only if the available welfare gains exceed the welfare losses. 
The antitrust injury standard makes it easy to dispose of many 
antitrust claims.17 A damages claim by the target of a tender off er is 
14. 429 U.S. at 488. As the Court summarized its holding, a plaintiff may recover only 
when the injury reflects ''the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive 
acts made possible by the violation." 429 U.S. at 489. The latter category presumably includes 
exclusionary practices. 
15. See also Page, AntitrtJSt .Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust 
Injury, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980). One qualification is necessary. The Court has held, 
without explanation, that rivals may recover for lost pro.fits in exclusionary practices cases. 
This is not always an optimal damages remedy, although recovery by rivals may be justified to 
the extent they serve as proxies for injured purchasers and to the extent the lost pro.fits reflect 
part of the allocative loss from monopoly. Easterbrook, Sllpra note 11, at 326-33. 
16. In addition to Brunswick, see, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 
U.S. SS1 (1981); Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251, 2SS (3d Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, IOI S. Ct. 3029 (1981); Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc. v. AT&T, 615 
F.2d 1372, 1391-92 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 291-98 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
17. For applications, see Easterbrook, S11pra note 11; Page, supra note 15, at 489-503. 
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among the easiest. The target is a beneficiary, not a victim, of any 
antitrust injury. If the prospective merger between bidder and target 
would increase the resulting firm's market power to an unacceptable 
degree, both bidder and target share in the monopoly profits thus 
produced. The target's shareholders receive their portion as the pre-
mium price offered by the bidder. No plausible theory of damages 
allows a recovery when the plaintiff has only gains to show for the 
violation. And the gains from increased monopoly power are the 
full measure of the target's consequences: because section 7 of the 
Clayton Act applies only to acquiring firms, the target's shareholders 
receive the profits without any risk of liability.18 
Targets nonetheless assert that they will be injured by a takeover, 
and some courts have agreed with them. They maintain, for exam-
ple, that the tender offer will change the identity of their sharehold-
ers, imperil the status of valued managers, threaten ongoing projects, 
disclose trade secrets, and commingle assets so that the restoration of 
competition will be more difficult. 19 We may grant that all of these 
assertions are true. So what? Unless these dislocations are part of 
the allocative efficiency loss of monopoly, neither legal nor economic 
principles suggest that the target may complain. 
One group of the asserted injuries identifies dislocations common 
to all tender offers. Any acquisition opposed by the target's manag-
ers will produce an unwelcome change in the identity· of sharehold-
ers, imperil the managers' job security, put projects favored by 
today's managers in jeopardy, and so on. The existence of these dis-
locations has nothing to do with any antitrust problem. Quite the 
contrary, these dislocations may well be the source of substantial cost 
savings, as the bidder takes over and makes improvements in the 
way the target is run. Such dislocations are common to all tender 
offers, those that do and those that do not present antitrust problems. 
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). One court has held that the acquired firm may be joined as 
a defendant even though it committed no wrong, and it has raised the possibility of rescission 
as a remedy for the acquiring firm's acts. United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 
222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978). The court made it clear, however, that such a 
remedy would be used only as a last resort and then only when shareholdings were closely 
held. No court has ordered rescission in any antitrust case. 
The acquired firm's managers also bear no exposure. They avoid personal liability unless 
they participate in some post-acquisition violation. They could not be responsible for the 
merger itself if they publicly announce their opposition to it. See United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 463-65 (1978); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 
(1962). 
19. For a comprehensive list, see the complaint in Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., Veri-
fied Complaint at 21-24, [1981-82) 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 64,379 (N.D. Ohio). The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision to enjoin the LTV offer for Grumman relied on several of these 
"injuries," including concerns that the offer would "disrupt Grumman's business" or lead to 
liquidation of Grumman's (money-losing) nonaerospace components. See 665 F.2d at 15-16. 
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For the reasons we have developed, cost reductions are not a 
proper source of complaint, even when these savings accompany an 
increase in monopoly power. And if, as is possible, a given acquisi-
tion produces no cost savings, dislocations of this sort still are not an 
appropriate basis oflegal complaint, any more than they would be in 
the absence of an antitrust problem. If the buyer is mistaken in 
thinking that it can realize cost savings, it pays the price of its error 
without the need for legal intervention.20 These dislocations are not 
"legal" injury both because they may be symptoms of cost reduc-
tions and because there is no need for intervention to cause the par-
ties to bear all appropriate costs. They do so automatically. 
A second group of injuries states potential legal wrongs, but 
wrongs unrelated to antitrust. Theft of trade secrets, for example, is 
a recognized legal wrong. But it is an implausible wrong in a tender 
offer case because the bidder will not have access to the secrets until 
it has acquired the target, and then it can use its secrets as it will. 
The value of the trade secrets to the target already is re.fleeted in the 
price of the target's stock; when the bidder acquires the stock it pays 
for the secrets and can hardly steal what it has purchased. If the 
transfer of secrets to the bidder nonetheless may be characterized as 
a legal wrong to the target, that wrong cannot be connected with 
harm to competition.21 The bidder's use of the target's trade secrets 
will enable the bidder to be more, not less, effective in competing 
with third parties. It is not a source of allocative efficiency loss from 
monopoly. 
We do not mean that antitrust and innovation are unrelated. 
There is a long-standing and unresolved dispute among economists 
whether higher concentration increases or decreases the amount of 
innovation. Our point, rather, is that the bidder's use of existing 
knowledge developed by the target cannot decrease competition un-
less it suppresses a process that competes with the bidder's own and 
that formerly had influenced price. This may occur in some cases, 
and when it does it is a legitimate source of objection to the acquisi-
tion. But it is not captured by a cry that the bidder will obtain and 
use unspecified trade secrets, and at all events the target, which 
would reap part of the gain from the suppression of competition, 
does not suffer any of the injury. 
20. See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 278-80. 
21. See A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instr., Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980) (the sale of 
proprietary assets of the target "is ... lacking the essential connection between injury and the 
aims of the antitrust laws necessary to give . . . standing" for the target to bring an antitrust 
suit). See also Note, Rethinking Antitrust .Damages, 33 STAN. L. RBv. 329, 342 n.49 (1981). 
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This leads immediately to the final category of harm, which in-
volves plausible antitrust injury. The target may allege that it will be 
hard to disestablish any merger effected after a successful bid and 
observe that this difficulty augments the allocative loss of the merger. 
New mergers are notoriously hard to undo.22 It is possible to argue, 
with fair support, that unless a merger is enjoined (or a hold separate 
order entered) before consummation, we may as well forget about 
attempting to disestablish the resulting firm. Congress relied on 
these concerns in enacting the premerger notification rules of the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976; the statute gives antitrust enforce-
ment agencies the opportunity to act before the merger takes place.23 
But although the difficulty of arranging effective divestiture is 
cause for concern, it is hard to see why it entitles the target to bring 
suit. The target suffers no injury. As we have pointed out, it is a 
substantial beneficiary to the extent the combination obtains monop-
oly profits.24 Although the assets spun off in a divestiture may be 
"weakened" as a competitive force, this is not equivalent to saying 
that the target corporation has been harmed by the acquisition-and-
divestiture. The ''weakness" of the assets presumably allows the 
firms in the market to continue to charge a price higher than that . 
prevailing under competition ( otherwise there is no antitrust worry 
about the problems of divestiture), and these monopoly profits can 
be shared by bidder and target. Some of the target's assets will re-
main in the bidder's corporate shell, but the target has no entitlement 
to keep the same structure forever, and even if carved into pieces 
suffers no injury (antitrust or otherwise) so long as the sum of the 
value of the pieces exceeds the value of the firm under the old organ-
ization. If, perchance, the bidder cannot obtain a high value for the 
"weakened" assets, only the bidder suffers; the target's shareholders 
were long since compensated. The difficulty of undoing an anticom-
petitive merger may support relief at the behest of someone who 
22. See R. PosNER, supra note 11, at 80-89; Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victo-
ries?, 12 J. L. & EcoN. 43 (1969); Pfunder, Paine & Whittemore, Coinpliance With .Divestiture 
Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 19 (1972). See also Easterbrook, Breaking lip Is Hard to .Do, 5 REGULATION 25 (Nov.-
Dec. 1981). 
23. See FfC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FfC v. Exxon Corp., 
636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 
1982) (courts exercise traditional equitable powers in suits by antitrust agencies). 
24. The Second Circuit thought that the ''two competitors might be expected to prefer the 
advantages of diminished competition. But in reality it is only the resulting entity that would 
enjoy such advantages." Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981). This 
overlooks the fact that much of the anticipated benefit of the combination is paid, in advance, 
to the target's shareholders as a premium over the market price of the shares. 
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would be injured, but it provides little support for a suit by one of 
the beneficiaries. 
The target might argue, though, that it is entitled to recover as a 
participant in the violation that has not received its appropriate 
share. But here, too, the argument falls short. Although the 
Supreme Court has restricted the scope of the in pari de/icto defense, 
so that even those who participate in a violation may recover dam-
ages from coconspirators, it has not abolished the requirement that 
there be cognizable damages to recover as a precondition of suit.25 
It may be helpful to re-emphasize the linchpin of the argument to 
this point: The only purpose of the antitrust laws is to maximize the 
allocative efficiency of the economy. This is the source of the Court's 
conclusion in Brunswick that only "antitrust injury'' - the injury 
that represents or directly flows from a reduction in allocative effi-
ciency - is compensable in damages. The claim of a target to bring 
an antitrust suit depends on a different view of antitrust. If, for ex-
ample, antitrust had created a substantive entitlement for firms to 
"remain whole," reg~dless of the consequences for resource alloca-
tion, then surely the target could sue to enforce that right. Standing 
depends on the theory of liability. But because the theory of liability 
depends on identifying a reduction in allocative efficiency, and dam-
ages depend on tying the allocative loss to the plaintilfs injury, the 
target may not recover. 
C. The Relation Between Damages and Injunctions 
Our disc}lssion so far has proceeded as if damages were the only 
available remedy. They plainly are not; targets seek injunctions, not 
damages. The Supreme Court hinted in Brunswick that injunctions 
might be governed by rules other than the "antitrust injury'' stan-
dard, 26 and the courts of appeals have since been unable to agree on 
how the antitrust injury rule, and the hint in Brunswick, apply to 
25. Penna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); hut see 
THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1980). Justice 
White's concurrence, necessary to the majority in Penna L!fe, emphasized the requirement 
that the plaintiff show antitrust injury. 392 U.S. at 144-47. 
26. 429 U.S. at 491 (Pueblo may seek equitable relief on remand). It is difficult to know 
what to make of this, for the Court could not have meant to authorize a divestiture order. 
Divestiture is unavailable in private suits, International Tel & Tel Corp. v. General Tel. & 
Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), and if, as the opinion indicated, the merger was 
beneficial to competition, an order of divestiture would have been as "inimical to the purposes 
of these [antitrust] laws," 429 U.S. at 488, as an order to pay damages. It seems likely, then, 
that the Court meant to hold open the possibility of an injunction against any exclusionary 
practices made possible by the merger, practices that might cause Pueblo to suffer antitrust 
injury. 
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injunctions sought by targets of tender offers.27 The target's claim to 
an injunction appears, at first glance, to be stronger than its claims to 
damages. Even if it is not injured, the target possesses the informa-
tion, and the target's managers the incentive, to enforce the antitrust 
laws. Targets are admirable private attorneys general - or so it may 
appear. We argue that appearances are deceiving. 
I. Statutory Construction 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes district courts to 
grant injunctions, tells courts to use common-law standards.28 It 
provides that courts may issue injunctions "under the same condi-
tions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct 
that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity . . . ."29 
Although courts exercising their common-law powers have some 
flexibility in interpreting the Clayton Act, they are not free to alter 
the remedial scheme established by Congress in 1914 in order to pro-
duce some system they prefer30 - for example, one under which 
courts would exercise their maximum powers under article III of the 
Constitution so that any colorably interested person could obtain an 
injunction.31 The statute explicitly links injunctions to threatened 
27. In two cases before Bnmswick the Second Circuit held that the target of a tender offer 
would not be permitted to seek either damages or an injunction. Missouri Portland Cement 
Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 86&:°"70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 -(1974) (injunc-
tion) (pointing out that the bidder's interest lies in furthering the target's welfare); GAF Corp. 
v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 757-59 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) 
(damages) (pointing out that any anticompetitive effects would not be felt by the target). An-
other case, by announcing that an antitrust plaintiff must show that it is within the "zone of 
interests" protected by the antitrust laws, apparently foreclosed such suits. Malamud v. Sin-
clair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1145 (6th Cir. 1975). After Brunswick, one court squarely held 
· that the interests of a target lie outside the protection of the antitrust laws, a rationale equally 
applicable to damages and injunctions (although the case involved only damages). A.D.M. 
Corp. v. Sigma Instr., Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980). Another court held that the 
Brunswick antitrust injury test applies in suits for injunctions, although in some slightly 
weaker form. Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 
1980). How much weaker the court did not say. But in two cases that do not even cite Bruns-
wick, the Second and Sixth Circuits have allowed targets to seek injunctions against tender 
offers. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing Cargill by 
limiting its holding to conglomerate [i.e., as the court saw it in Grumman, harmless) mergers; 
reasoning that a target may obtain an injunction if it can show that "the threat to the public 
interest from the loss of competition is serious and not likely to be undone by a divestiture in 
the event the acquisition is found to be unlawful after it has occurred"); Marathon Oil Co. v. 
Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982) (not mentioning 
the problem, although it had been briefed). 
28. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969). 
29. 15 u.s.c. § 26 (1976). 
30. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), holds that courts 
must respect the remedial scheme that Congress supposed it was enacting in 1914 and may not 
add new features (such as contribution) that they now find desirable. 
31. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (allowing 
uninjured ''testers" to bring a housing discrimination suit; the Court relied on a clear statutory 
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"loss or damage," words that conjure up an antitrust injury require-
ment of the sort recognized in Brunswick. The injunction may be 
used to ward off impending injury, but it is impossible to interpret 
the statute as authorizing suits by anyone who takes an interest in the 
subject. The interested person must be an (irreparably) injured per-
son as well. 
This is enough to establish that the target is not entitled to relief: 
It does not suffer any of the irreparable, antitrust injury that might 
be caused if the conduct in question is indeed a violation. We also 
think that the common-law restrictions on injunctions incorporated 
in section 16 promote an optimal level of antitrust enforcement. 
This conclusion rests on two considerations, one that we off er with 
confidence and the other more tentatively: First, the target's manag-
ers have the wrong incentives; second, injunctions are generally less 
desirable remedies because they impede the commission of "efficient 
violations." 
2. The Target's Managers Lack the Appropriate 
Litigation Incentives 
Our discussion of optimal damages assumed that plaintiffs would 
be willing to settle for the authorized damages or some lesser 
amount; if they did not, they would bear the risks of losing the case 
but gain nothing. No matter what happened, the (putative) defen-
dant could elect between going forward (with the risk of paying opti-
mal damages) or desisting from questionable conduct. This decision 
would not be influenced by the identity or number of the plaintiffs. 
At least as an initial matter, rights to injunctions and rights to 
damages have the same deterrent force. A party with the right to 
obtain an injunction may compromise the litigation for a sum 
greater than its loss but less than the loss to the defendant from de-
sisting. When the defendant's gains from the questionable conduct 
exceed the plaintiff's losses, the parties can settle the claims and al-
low the conduct to proceed, just as damages allow it to proceed. The 
parties could strike these bargains even after injunctions were issued. 
One can show that if courts decide legal questions without error and 
determine at no cost the gains to be had from enjoining (or permit-
ting) a given course of conduct, there is no practical difference be-
tween injunctions and damages remedies. 32 In either event all 
design affording extensive rights to litigate); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, IOI S. Ct. 1114 
(1982) (same). 
32. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. I (1960); Polinsky, supra note 5, at 
1106-12. 
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efficient business combinations would take place, and inefficient ones 
would be deterred by the legal rule. 
Bargaining costs are not zero, however, and parties do not always 
bargain cooperatively. An injunction will be the end of the matter in 
some cases: the parties will be unable to bargain around the decree, 
even if such bargaining would improve their joint welfare. The bar-
gaining problem is difficult if more than one party is entitled to an 
injunction. The defendant will be unwilling to settle the case with 
the first plaintiff, because some other plaintiff could seek (and ob-
tain) the same kind of injunction; the defendant's deal with the first 
plaintiff would not allow it to continue its planned course of conduct. 
In practice, then, an injunction may frustrate the system of opt~al 
compliance that is facilitated by a system of damages. The bargain-
ing problem is doubly difficult if one or more of the parties with 
rights to injunctions has incentives that differ from the rest. This 
party may be unwilling to settle the case for a sum that approximates 
its share of the damages. 
When the parties may have conflicting interests, their strategies 
will not take into account the costs they impose on each other, and 
bargaining may become hopelessly embroiled. That is the case here. 
The managers of a target firm and the customers of that firm's prod-
ucts do not have congruent interests with respect to the merger; simi-
larly, the interests of managers and investors in the targets are not 
congruent. An injunction valuable to managers (who preserve their 
offices) may be detrimental to both shareholders (who lose the pre-
mium) and customers (who lose the combination of cost savings and 
damages to which they would otherwise be entitled).33 The potential 
plaintiffs may fight among each other for the lion's share of the gains 
from permitting ( or prohibiting) a given transaction, and in the pro-
cess they may either dissipate the gains or prevent their realization. 
If the target's managers have the right to obtain injunctions, then; we 
may expect to encounter greater difficulty in bargaining to an opti-
mal solution. 
Targets of tender offers are poor plaintiffs for a further reason. 
Because, as we have emphasized, the targets suffer none of the allo-
cative welfare loss from monopoly, the incentives of the managers 
lead them away from settlements that benefit consumers. 34 They 
33. If the merger indeed augments monopoly power in violation of the antitrust laws, the 
customers would obtain damages equal to the eventual overcharge, and they (or others in 
society) would obtain the benefit of any production cost savings attributable to the merger. 
And if the merger does not augment monopoly power, the customers would obtain through 
price reductions some of the benefits of the merger. 
34. Thus, as one court put it: "Our primary concern is that we have before us [in actions 
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bargain to maximize the gains from the violation (some of which 
they may appropriate in salary and perquisites),35 not to force bid-
ders to pursue only efficient combinations. The targets' managers 
have no concern for the consumers; under standard corporation law 
the managers' loyalty runs to investors, at the expense of noninves-
tors. 36 The managers could be motivated to bring the suit even if it 
were clear that the cost savings of a combination would overwhelm 
any increase in monopoly power. Or they could insist on settlements 
in amounts exceeding the gains of the transaction to the bidder, thus 
blocking efficient combinations. The managers' assertion that they 
sue as Good Samaritans is not credible, and if it were credible it 
would condemn managers under state law, for the reasons we discuss 
in Part II. 
3. The Relative Efficiency of .Damages and Injunctions 
Although we are confident that the target's managers, given their 
unusual incentives, are the wrong parties to seek injunctions, we 
think it appropriate to sketch, if only tent'!,tively, the appropriate re-
lationship between damages and injunctions in antitrust law on the 
assumption that those entitled to injunctions desire the socially opti-
mal outcome. 
We assume for now that the standard for issuance of injunctions 
in antitrust law is not significantly different from, say, the standard 
in nuisance law. In either case the plaintiff seeks relief against a 
long-lasting course of conduct that harms many widely scattered 
people, each with a relatively small stake. Section 16 refers to the 
customary powers of courts of equity. These make antitrust injunc-
tions depend on the usual equitable inquiries: irreparable injury, the 
absence of an adequate remedy at law, a favorable balance of the 
seeking antitrust injunctions] a plaintiff'who adequately represents the interests of the 'victims' 
of the antitrust violation." Schoenkopfv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 
211 (3d Cir. 1980). The court declined to award injunctive relief to a middleman on the basis 
of assertions that the practice in question had harmed small businesses; the court concluded 
that the plaintiff' had interests adverse to those of the businesses it purported to represent, 
35. The difficulty of bargaining may explain why managers usually do not sell their acqui-
escence in a takeover proposal in exchange for explicit payments to themselves. There are too 
many actors. It is hard to agree on a division of the spoils, and there is a significant chance 
that one dissatisfied manager (or any shareholder who learns of the deal) would blow the 
whistle on such outright pocketing of the gains. 
36. Managers have no general obligation to avoid violatiµg regulatory laws, when viola-
tions are profitable to the firm, because the sanctions set by the legislature and courts are a 
measure of how much firms should spend to achieve compliance. See Engel, An Approach lo 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. R.Ev. I (1979); Katz, Responsibility and the Modem 
Corporation, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 75 (1960). We put to one side laws concerning violence or other 
acts thought to be malum in se. 
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equities (an injunction will not issue if the harm to the defendant 
would substantially exceed the gain to the plaintiff, a rule fortified in 
preliminary injunction cases by the possibility that the court's initial 
assessment may prove mistaken). The traditional conditions are 
designed to make injunctions a remedy of last resort, indeed to make 
injunctions unavailable despite injury in many cases.37 Many schol-
ars have questioned the placement of injunctions at the bottom of 
the list of remedial priorities, arguing that they should be more freely 
available because they are so effective and avoid the nasty problems 
often involved in computing damages and distributing them to in-
jured parties.38 In some respects these arguments have prevailed; in-
junctions appear to be the instruments of choice in civil rights cases. 
We suspect, although we do not seek to prove, that these arguments 
are not compelling in economic cases. 
We have mentioned the principal difficulty in the use of injunc-
tions: It is hard to bargain to an optimal solution when many parties 
possess their own rights to injunctions, each of which would be a 
sufficient cause for the defendants to abandon their plans. When 
there are many potential plaintiffs the bargaining problems may be 
insuperable.39 Bargaining costs include not only the time and ex-
pense of transacting with many parties but also the additional costs 
created by holdouts. One or more potential plaintiffs may elect to 
behave strategically, withholding assent to any given offer in the 
hope of receiving a better one, of appropriating to himself as much 
of the total gain from the transaction as possible. When the remedy 
is damages, in contrast, no one's holdout can frustrate the progress of 
efficiency-increasing projects. 
It is, of course, possible that injunctions themselves could com-
mand defendants to follow the socially best course. But for the rea-
sons we discussed in Part I-A, it is unlikely that courts will issue 
optimal orders when they cannot determine the costs defendants will 
incur and the gains forgone in complying with their decrees - that 
is, all the time. The ~raditional rules of equity, under which injunc-_ 
37. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88-92 (1974) (loss compensable in money is 
not irreparable even if want of funds pending adjudication would cause great distress); 
Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980). 
38. The best example is 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 38-67, 74-85 (1978). For 
an effective critique of Fiss's reasoning, see Laycock, Injunctions and the Illeparable Injury 
Rule, 51 ToxAs L. REv. 1065 (1979). 
39. See Polinsky, supra note 5, at 1106-12. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5. 
For variations of this theme in contract cases, see Kronman, Spec!fic Peifonnance, 45 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 351 (1978); Schwartz, The Case for Spectftc Perfonnance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). 
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tions are extraordinary remedies, may well be reasonable accommo-
dations to these and the other problems we have identified. 
We do not mean to say that injunctions have no role in antitrust 
cases. They do, as Congress contemplated they would. But they 
function to fulfill the traditional roles. In suits by the United States 
or the FTC, the plaintiff presumably has made (or can make) area-
sonably accurate calculation of the costs and benefits of the merger. 
If the government makes a mistake in bringing the suit, it is rela-
tively easy for the parties to ~argain, either before or after an injunc-
tion has been entered. Antitrust suits by the government are part of 
a process of cooperative negotiation that begins before the complaint 
is filed and continues until the suit is dismissed (perhaps after a vol-
untary accommodation by the defendant), the defendant wins, or 
structural relief has been carried out. The relief phase often lasts 
longer than the determination of the merits and entails careful nego-
tiation designed to maximize social welfare.40 
Suits by consumers can serve a similar function. Because no one 
consumer can capture very much of the value of the litigation, such 
cases generally proceed as class actions in.name or in fact; the joint 
litigation spreads the costs of the suit among the prospective benefi-
ciaries. When a suit is brought before the merger is consummated, 
and thus before a court could determine either the plaintiffs' losses 
from the merger or the defendants' losses from complying, an in-
junction may induce the parties to bargain. And because the plain-
tiffs or, more accurately, their lawyers, act as a class, the bargaining 
may take place at relatively low cost. (Low relative to the cost of, 
say, determining damages in litigation after a merger has been con-
summated.) The plaintiffs' action in their self-interest is reasonably 
consistent with the social interest in avoiding monopoly, because the 
plaintiffs in such a suit are the actual or potential victims of the mo-
nopoly overcharge. 
Things are otherwise when one of the plaintiffs does not suffer 
the harm that is the source of the objection to monopolies. There is 
no convincing reason to conclude that bargaining initiated by such a 
plaintiff would move society closer to the optimal outcome. This is 
one explanation, perhaps the most important one, of why a plaintiff 
does not have standing just because he professes interest; he must 
also suffer actual injury of the sort the statute was designed to pre-
vent.41 Even "good" enforcers with knowledge of the facts and phil-
40. We bypass here the question whether this kind of negotiation achieves its objectives, 
given the incentives of the government's agents. 
41. Another reason for limiting the class of plaintiffs is to ensure that those who are injured 
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osophical commitments that ensure dedicated representation of the 
interests they espouse are turned away if they suffer no injury to 
themselves. This actual injury approach informs the definition of a 
case or controversy under article III, 42 of "prudential" standing doc-
trines emphasizing the "zone of interests" protected by a statute or 
constitutional rule,43 of the "representativeness" requirement in class 
actions, and of the traditional rules of equity alike. The principle is 
no less applicable in antitrust cases. 
II. ANTITRUST DEFENSES AND THE FIDUCIARY 
DUTY OF MANAGERS 
If we are correct that managers lack the authority to· obtain relief 
under the antitrust laws, we need not worry about whether their sta-
tus as agents of the investors permits them to apply for such relief. 
But if we are wrong about antitrust and equitable principles, the 
question remains whether managers violate their .fiduciary duties by 
pursuing antitrust claims. Courts that have faced this question have 
assumed without analysis that managers' state law duty allows, even 
requires, them to file antitrust suits if federal law holds out the pros-
pect of relief against the takeover.44 It is not true, however, that 
there is a legal duty to enforce every legal right. Managers may de-
cline to enforce legal rights, because enforcement may cost the firm 
more than nonenforcement.45 Managers may contract, explicitly or 
implicitly, to forego enforcement of legal rights. We show in this 
will have the appropriate incentives to bring suit, without diminution in recoveries or in-
creased litigation costs as a result of the interference of third parties. 
42. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). See Brilmayer, The Jurispmdence of Article IIL· Perspectives 
on the Case or Controversy Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297, 306-15 (1979); Scott, Standing 
in the Supreme Court -A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. RE.v. 645 (1973). 
43. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 
388 (1981) (applying the "zone of interests" test in an antitrust case; plaintiff must show that its 
interests are those protected by the antitrust laws); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for the Separation of Church and State, 102 S. Ct. 752, 760 (1982) (describing the 
"zone of interests" test as a generally applicable prudential principle of standing). 
44. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 
(1981); Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., [1977-2] Trade Cas. ,r 61,717 (N.D. ill. 1977). 
45. Managers justifiably waive legal rights when shareholders' wealth is increased by not 
litigating. United Copper Sec. Co. -v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917); 
Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1957). This principle underlies the option of 
directors to dismiss derivative litigation brought to enforce a legal right of the firm (and of 
disinterested directors to dismiss derivative litigation even when the managers and other direc-
tors are the defendants). Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 
F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,631,393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979). But cf. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del 1981) (the 
ability of managers to dismiss derivative litigation is subject to unspecified limits to be devised 
in particular cases). Zapata is criticized in Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Recent .Developments in .Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982). It 
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Part that, because shareholders' wealth is highest if managers do not 
pursue antitrust litigation, there is an implicit contract between man-
agers and investors not to enforce any federal rights the firm may 
have. 
A. Antitrust Suits and Shareholders' Wealth 
We have maintained elsewhere that the .fiduciary duties in corpo-
rate law provide a standard form contractual clause governing the 
agency relationship between investors and managers.46 The exis-
tence of fiduciary duties increases investors' wealth by preserving the 
gains available from the division of labor - the delegation of au-
thority from investors to skilled managers - while limiting manag-
ers' ability to further their interests at the expense of investors. 
Because it is too costly to anticipate and contract for every contin-
gency, courts supply a flexible fiduciary principle that approximates 
the bargain the parties would have struck were negotiation and en-
forcement costless. This fiduciary principle supplements market 
remedies, such as adjustments in salary or changes in career pros-
pects, that induce managers to act in investors' interests. Whether 
the fiduciary duty of targets' managers requires, permits, or pre-
cludes antitrust litigation depends, therefore, on whether investors 
would contract for managers to file such suits. We think investors 
would not; antitrust litigation undercuts shareholders' desires to 
maximize their wealth. The tender offer is one of the market's con-
straints on managers' behavior, and investors are unlikely to contract 
away such a powerful constraint. 
The case is clearest when a bidder makes a cash tender offer, at a 
premium, for all of the target's shares. Because the shareholders re-
ceive cash, they do not care whether the takeover may later be held 
unlawful. They can take their premium and invest it free of antitrust 
risk. Managers' attempts to thwart the tender offers deprive share-
holders of the premium and give them nothing in return. 
The problem is more complicated if the bidder seeks less than 
100% of the shares, or if the offer includes stock or other securities 
instead of cash. Some of the target's shareholders then would have 
investments in firms with an antitrust exposure as a result of the 
takeover, and they might conceivably suffer injury if the firm were 
penalized under the antitrust laws or required to divest assets at a 
is defended, albeit by confession and avoidance, in Veasey, Judicial Review of Business .Deel• 
sions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1247, 1260-73 (1982). 
46. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. _ (1982); Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1170. 
May 1982] Tender Offer Antitrust Suits 1173 
loss.47 It might appear necessary for managers to bring antitrust 
suits if the losses to these shareholders threatened to exceed the gains 
to the investors who received cash. 
The possibility is more apparent than real. The investors easily 
can avoid any risk of loss. So long as they receive securities of the 
bidder ( or the firm resulting from the merger) valued in the market 
at more than the price of the securities they surrendered, they can 
sell the securities and receive cash from other investors who are will-
ing to bear the antitrust risks.48 Although there is every reason to 
think that the market would value these risks accurately - the expo-
sure to antitrust litigation would be well known, and the market 
price of widely held securities would be set, as always, by the trades 
of well-informed investors among themselves - it does not matter 
here whether the market prices the securities efficiently. Investors 
would care only about the prices, efficiently arrived at or not, they 
could receive. Because all of the tender offers of concern here in-
volve a substantial premium relative to the pre-offer price,49 inves-
tors who wish to avoid antitrust risk do not lose. They can sell their 
securities at a profit. Managers' resistance to tender offers conse-
quently harms shareholders even when the bidder seeks less than all 
securities. so 
47. Whether they would in fact suffer injury is another matter altogether. The best avail-
able evidence indicates that securities of firms subject to adverse antitrust actions do not do 
poorly in the market Although the challenge causes a declinr. in the price of shares, the de-
cline does not take ba~k all of the gains obtained on the anno~cement of the acquisition. 
Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, 31 J. FIN. EcoN. _ (1982); 
Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715 (1976); 
Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers, forthcoming in 37 J. FIN. 
ECON. _ (1982). 
48. This requires the investor to disinvest from the firm of his choice, but this is a conse-
quence of tender offers in general and does not flow from antitrust risks in particular. The 
market contains many other investments with risk and return characteristics similar to those a 
particular person may sell as a result of a tender offer. 
49. Tender offers commonly involve substantial premiums, and the nonacquired shares of 
the target firm continue to sell at a premium even after the bidder has purchased the shares it 
sought See, e.g., Bradley, Interjirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. 
Bus. 345, 345-47, 361-6S (1980). If antitrust exposure created a substantial risk of loss, the 
price of the offered package would fall below that of the target's existing securities. In that 
event there would be no need to worry about litigation: shareholders would retain their shares, 
and the offer would fail. 
SO. The fiduciary principle may·require managers of the target to refrain from speaking as 
well as litigating. Suppose managers have some information about a new product or plan that 
would, if developed, place the target in competition with the bidder. This information would 
not ordinarily come to light in a tender offer because new product information is not part of 
the required filings under either the Williams Act or the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act Managers' revelation of the information might flag an antitrust problem not previ-
ously perceived, thus reducing the value of the target's securities. The argument for revelation 
is strongest if managers fear that the antitrust problem, once recognized, would decrease the 
value of securities not acquired by the bidder; that raises a problem of equal treatment of 
shareholders. But we have argued elsewhere that investors unanimously prefer whatever sys-
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B. Suits To Trigger Auctions 
The effect of filing an antitrust suit cannot be fully analyzed with-
out considering the possibility that the litigation is a ploy to obtain a 
higher price by affording time for an auction, or at least a negotia-
tion, to develop. We doubt, however, th3:t managers are free to use 
the courts in this manner. Such suits have no antitrust purpose and 
probably amount to abuse of process.51 We are unaware of any case 
in which a target's managers justified antitrust litigation on this 
basis. 
Perhaps antitrust suits could be justified as efficient abuse of pro-
cess if they actually set off auctions, thereby causing the target's as-
sets to move to higher-valuing users.52 It is questionable, though, 
whether managers can use litigation to increase the price paid for the 
target's shares. Suits generally are designed to stifle bids altogether 
- a target that alleges that an acquisition would violate the antitrust 
laws would be hard pressed to change course if the bidder were to 
raise the price. Targets that initiate antitrust litigation frequently are 
not acquired by anyone. And although some firms, such as Conoco 
and Marathon, have been acquired after they commenced antitrust 
litigation, the suits served in each instance to prevent an acquisition 
by the high bidder and to discourage bids by other firms in the same 
industry as the initial bidder. In the :final bidding for Conoco, Mo-
bil's bid exceeded DuPont's by $10 per share; Mobil's bid for Mara-
thon exceeded U.S. Steel's by $1 per share; and there is no reason to 
suppose that Mobil (or some other firm) would not have offered 
more but for the costs and risks imposed by the litigation. 
It is possible that the antitrust litigation buys the time necessary 
for an auction to develop, but this is unlikely. The delays imposed 
by the Williams Act are more than sufficient to this end, especially so 
tem maximizes their expected gains, even if the gains are distributed unequally. Easterbrook 
& Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 46. If that is so, then the fiduciary prin-
ciple calls for managers' silence. Once again, investors can protect their own interests by 
selling their securities in the market 
5 I. The initiation of legal proceedings to obtain objectives other than the judgment osten-
sibly sought in the proceedings is tortious abuse of process. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 682 (1978); Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity far Concerted Attempts to Influence 
Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 
HAR.v. L. REv. 715, 732-35 (1973). We doubt that rules of immunization such as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine would cover the use of an antitrust suit to set off an auction. For a gen-
eral discussion of the Hoen-Pennington doctrine, see Fischel, Antitrust Liability far Attempts to 
Injluence Governmental Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington .Doctrine, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977). 
52. It is important to distinguish gains in the efficient employment of assets from mere 
transfer payments. In many cases auctions would produce only the latter. See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 2, at 1175, 1188-90. 
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because the initial bidder must supply potential rivals with substan-
tial information in its statutory disclosures.53 A rule that sets off an 
auction but invariably makes a casualty of the first bidder, moreover, 
does not encourage more auctions in the future. It instead conduces 
to fewer first bids. As we now discuss, even if antitrust suits some-
times lead to a higher price being paid for the target's shares, the 
higher price today comes at the expense of shareholders' wealth 
tomorrow. 
Shareholders' wealth is greatest under a legal rule that maximizes 
the sum of today's price and the likely price to be paid under some 
future value-increasing action such as a tender offer, where each out-
come is discounted by its probability. A legal rule allowing manag-
ers to file antitrust suits reduces both components of value. It makes 
bids less likely (by penalizing first bidders), and in all probability 
does not significantly increase the sums paid when bids occur be-
yond what would be realized in naturally occurring auctions. Thus 
the value of the future gains falls. Simultaneously the value realiz-
able today falls. Outsiders find it less profitable to monitor the be-
havior of managers. The agency costs of management rise, as the 
managers have less incentive to operate firms efficiently. We have 
argued before that shareholders' expected wealth is greatest if man-
agers do not engage in defensive tactics, and the standard-form con-
tract supplied by the fiduciary principle should recognize this.54 
Investors would interdict defenses, including auctions, if they could 
do so at reasonable cost, and legal rules should implement this result. 
C. Implications of Corporate Social Responsibility 
We consider a final argument: that the corporation has a "social 
responsibility'' to avoid complicity in illegal conduct, no matter the 
cost to investors. The firm has a duty, the argument runs, to behave 
in a lawful and ethical manner. Although failure to pursue antitrust 
litigation may not violate the law, it would offend a sense of ethical 
53. This is not to say that, all things considered, the Williams Act is beneficial. We have 
repeatedly criticized it in other writings. 
54. We develop this in detail in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2. See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Takeover Bids, .Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 
(1981). Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash 
Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN'. 371, 398-403 (1980), supply data establishing that defense 
decreases the number of offers. For arguments that defense for the purpose of triggering an 
auction should be encouraged, see Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Of-
f ers, 95 HAR.v. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against .Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 8~9, 868-75 (1981); Gilson, Com-
petitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer .Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. _ (1982). 'y/e 
reply to these arguments in Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 
35 STAN. L. REV. _ (1982). 
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conduct to which managers are entitled to conform, even at the ex-
pense of shareholders' well-being. 
The argument has a powerful rhetorical appeal, but here at least 
the rhetoric is empty. As we have observed,55 a corporation subject 
to a tender offer does not commit an offense by failing to resist the 
bid. Only the bidder violates the statutes. The social responsibility 
argument thus must be that managers not only have a duty to avoid 
acting unlawfully themselves but also may act, in the corporation's 
name and at shareholders' expense, to prevent others from acting 
unlawfully. On this reasoning, managers of a construction firm 
should refuse a lucrative contract; to build a new plant for IBM if 
they thought IBM might use the facility to monopolize the manufac-
ture of some computer part. Only the most extreme advocates of 
"corporate social responsibility'' adopt such a position. 
We need not canvass the arguments for and against corporate 
social responsibility - a phrase with as many meanings as it has 
proponents - to conclude that managers may not draw the cloak of 
"responsibility'' around their efforts to fend off acquisition bids. 
However desirable "responsibility'' may be in principle, the state-
ment of such an open-ended objective offers no standards against 
which to assess managers' conduct. The managers' assertion that 
"social responsibility'' calls for antitrust litigation is in many cases 
too transparent an excuse for self-protection. When managers face 
the sort of conflict that every tend~r offer presents, a conflict between 
investors' interests and managers' continued employment, it is alto-
gether too easy for managers to find - to their delight - that some 
ethical principle enables them to take the high road of defending 
against the acquisition. 56 
55. ·see text at note 18, supra. 
56. The managers of Marshall Field seem to have gone out of their way to prove this point. 
When Carter Hawley Hale (CHH), another retailer, approached Field in 1977, its managers 
quickly obtained a legal opinion stating that the acquisition would be unlawful because CHH 
had one store in Chicago. This was so serious, the opinion stated, that the problem could not 
be cured by divestiture of CHH's Chicago store. Field then instituted antitrust litigation and 
took other measures to defeat CHH's $42 offer. Yet when, in 1982, a group of investors led by 
Carl Icahn started to purchase shares of Field, threatening to obtain a majority (or to wage a 
proxy fight for control), Field's managers promptly sought a White Knight from among other 
large retailers, all of which operated stores in Chicago. Batus, the suitor favored by Field's 
managers, owned stores in severafcities in common with Field, including one right across the 
street from a large Field store in Chicago. The Batus offer of $30 per share was worth less than 
half of CHH's bid. (Cash of $42 received on, say, April I, 1978, and invested at an average 
rate of 12%, available from several almost riskless - and some tax-free -investments, would 
have been worth some $67.87 by April 1, 1982.) Field's managers, it has been widely reported, 
were amenable to the Batus offer because that firm has a history of not replacing the managers 
of newly acquired subsidiaries. The managers had tenure on their minds, for they obtained 
new long-term employment contracts in connection with the acquisition. And although the 
managers deny that self-protection was the motive for all of this, it is hard to grasp any other 
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We do not deny that managers legitimately may seek to obtain 
objectives defined by ethical considerations. Statutes and regula-
tions may be based wholly on ethics or distributive justice rather 
than wealth maximization, and they bind managers and investors 
alike.57 But these principles bind, to the extent they bind, because 
they are embedded in positive law. They cannot be derived from 
any notion that doing business as a corporation is a "privilege" for 
which society may demand some ethical repayment not specified in 
positive law. Corporations are not privileges; a corporation is no 
more than a convenient name for a nexus of contractual relation-
ships among people.58 Only people have moral obligations; corpora-
tions can no more be said to have moral obligations than does a 
building, an organization chart, or a contract. 
When the corporation is properly seen as a summary of a set of 
contractual relationships, it becomes difficult, probably impossible, 
to say that the agents (managers) may take it on themselves to define 
the responsibility of the firm. Responsible agents do their principals' 
bidding, thus carrying out the pledge by which they obtained their 
positions. 59 If there is to be responsibility - that is, if firms are to 
undertake benificent but wealth-reducing actions not commanded by 
statute - the investors are the appropriate parties to make that deci-
sion. One would expect that some investors would opt for "responsi-
bility'' and others not; firms ( and investors) would sort themselves 
out according to their taste for responsible conduct. Such a process 
of sifting would be impeded if managers have the authority to decide 
for themselves, free of constraint by their principals, whether and 
explanation of their curious about-face concerning the antitrust implications of the acquisition. 
(The FTC, in approving the Batus acquisition subject to limited divestiture because of an 
overlap in Milwaukee, must think that there was no antitrust problem at all in the CHH bid.) 
The history of the CHH offer is recounted in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981). For details of the Icahn purchases and the Batus 
offer, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1982, p. 29, col 3 (Midwest ed.), or any Wall Street 
Journal during March 1982. 
57. As we have argued in Part I, however, managers do not have an ethical duty to obey 
economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of 
these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of how much it 
wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on 
the supposition that managers not only may but also should violate the rules when it is profita-
ble to do so. See Engel, supra note 36. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1191. 
58. Fama,AgenC:)l Problems and tlte Theory ojtlte Finn, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980). For 
another use of the nexus-of-contracts way oflooking at the corporation, see Fischel, supra note 
45. See also R. HEsSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979), for a demonstration that 
all of the features we usually associate with corporations may be obtained by contract without 
regard to corporate law. 
59. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 1226, 1233-34 (1982); Broad v. 
Rockwell Intl Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 955-60 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.-506 
(1981). . 
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how much of the princip~' wealth should be sacrificed to the public 
welfare.60 
We doubt that the investors, as claimants to the firm's income 
stream, and managers, as their agents, have any moral obligation to 
sacrifice profitable opportunities so that someone else does not vio-
late the law. Firms that behave as Good Samaritans bestow benefits 
on others but do not receive equivalent gains in return. This is a 
common justification for legislation, which preserves some propor-
tionality of sacrifice. So long as investors lawfully may hire agents to 
maximize the investors' wealth, the investors have the right to expect 
that managers will be dedicated to their interests alone. Legislatures 
may command managers to act in "responsible" ways, and they 
often do, but then the problem of voluntary responsibility disap-
pears. Legislatures also could free managers from duties to maxi-
mize profits for shareholders, but none have done so. Managers do 
not now have a duty to relinquish profitable opportunities for the 
investors to pursue the managers' own notions of the public interest; 
precisely the opposite is true. Faithful agents pursue their principals' 
conception of the public ( or private) interest. 
CONCLUSION 
We have examined targets' antitrust suits from the perspective of 
federal antitrust law and state corporate law, each time considering 
both traditional legal principles and the insights afforded by eco-
nomics. Because both antitrust law and corporation law govern con-
sensual economic relations in markets, this seems an especially 
appropriate implement for the analysis. Although the conclusions 
we have reached are not beyond question - we have employed 
some assumptions about probable costs of bargaining and the likely 
effect on the number of bids of rules penalizing first bidders - we 
think the assumptions reasonable. The legal and economic argu-
ments coalesce in suggesting that antitrust suits by targets of tender 
offers are offensive to legal principles and harmful to the welfare of 
shareholders and the economy. 
60. For a critical treatment of one popular suggestion that agents act responsibly at the 
expense of investors, see Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 19 MICH. 
L. REv. 72 (1980). 
